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The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandates that U.S. transportation fuel 
producers blend specific volumes of ethanol and other biofuels with fossil fuels to spur 
U.S. biofuel production and to minimize foreign oil imports. Ethanol is more corrosive to 
auto engines than gasoline, and although vehicles manufactured since 2001 are approved 
to use up to a 15% ethanol blend (E15) (Naylor & Falcon, 2011), E10 is much more 
widely available. Ethanol producers therefore face a so-called blend wall at 10 percent—
a maximum amount of ethanol that is usable domestically based on the demand for 
gasoline. 
 Meanwhile, gasoline demand in the U.S. has declined since 2008, when high gas 
prices and the onset of the recession abruptly led Americans to drive less and to buy more 
fuel-efficient vehicles. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has since updated 
Federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to double fuel efficiency in 
cars and light duty trucks by 2025 to 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg) on average, further 
diminishing gasoline demand. 
 Until now, RFS and CAFE have mostly been examined separately or compared to 
hypothetical carbon cap and trade policies.  Analyzing how the RFS and CAFE interact is 
 important because unlike cap and trade, these two policies exist in the U.S. already, and 
they affect each other in ways unanticipated when each was created. This research uses a 
comparative statics model to examine the interactions between RFS and CAFE, first in 
2013, then in 2025, when updated CAFE standards have been fully implemented and 
average gas mileage for model year 2025 is 54.5 mpg. 
 This analysis finds that if both policies are implemented simultaneously in 2025, 
the outcome is incompatible with even an E15 blend wall.  While motor fuel consumers’ 
gains are 50 percent of their 2013 expenditures, gasoline producers lose surplus 
equivalent to 20 percent of their 2013 receipts.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), created in 2005 and expanded in 2007, 
mandates that U.S. transportation fuel producers blend specific volumes of ethanol and 
other biofuels with fossil fuels to spur U.S. biofuel production and minimize foreign oil 
imports. Ethanol is more corrosive to auto engines than gasoline, and although vehicles 
manufactured since 2001 are approved to use up to a 15% ethanol blend (E15) (Naylor & 
Falcon, 2011), E10 is much more widely available.  Ethanol producers therefore face a 
so-called blend wall at 10 percent—a maximum amount of ethanol that is usable 
domestically based on the demand for gasoline.  
Gasoline demand in the U.S. has declined since 2008, when high gas prices and 
the onset of the recession abruptly led Americans to drive less and to buy more fuel-
efficient cars (Pentland). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has since updated 
Federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to double fuel efficiency in 
cars and light duty trucks by 2025 to 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg), further diminishing 
gasoline demand (US EPA). Figure 1.1 shows the disparity between the 2007 and 2013 
projections for future gasoline and diesel use (data from EIA, graphic from Forbes). 
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Figure 1.1 
 
Because projected gasoline consumption from recent years is lower than 2007 
expectations, EPA has proposed amending the RFS to require less biofuel than originally 
called for in the statute (15.21 billion gallons in 2014, down from 18.15 billion gallons). 
The change has alarmed some corn growers and ethanol producers, who relied on the 
levels in the RFS to make long-term infrastructure investments, and some of whom fear 
the ethanol market could collapse if the RFS is lowered in subsequent years. Figure 1.2 
shows the existing surplus of ethanol in the U.S., which would grow larger were the RFS 
not amended.  
  
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Note: RFS line represents the implied annual conventional biofuels portion of the RFS 
target, which primarily includes corn ethanol. 
 
  The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007
RFS II, had two main goals in promoting
environmentally friendly, and increasing U.S. energy security by minimizing foreign oil 
imports. Ethanol in the U.S. is made primarily from corn, which is controversial for its 
impacts on water quality, food price
  Corn is a water- and energy
yield requires the use of i
 
Figure 1.2 
, which created the 
 biofuels: making transportation fuel more 
s, and climate change.  
-intensive crop. In many regions, reaching maximum 
rrigation systems that typically run on diesel fuel, a
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s well as the 
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use of nitrogen fertilizer, which is produced with natural gas and which can run off soil 
and cause water pollution.  
  Water pollution from land use change is also a concern—USDA notes that 
ethanol production has dramatically increased demand for U.S. corn since 2006, pushing 
corn and farmland prices to all-time highs in 2013. Producers have since had a strong 
incentive to remove land from conservation to grow corn, as well as to use existing 
working lands to plant corn continuously for multiple years rather than to rotate between 
corn and soybeans, which help naturally replenish nitrogen in the soil.  
Figure 1.3 shows average annual corn prices since 1926, demonstrating that 
recent price spikes made corn highly profitable in the short run. 
 
Figure 1.3 
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Economists also debate whether and how much ethanol impacts food prices. The 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2013) argues that ethanol 
drives up global food prices by increasing the price of corn and other food staples, though 
Gilbert (2010) and others have disputed that finding. In addition, since corn is used as 
livestock feed in the U.S., increased corn demand from ethanol also drives up meat 
prices. Thus, groups as diverse as the American Petroleum Institute, U.S. livestock 
producers, FAO, and some environmental organizations oppose the RFS. 
  The climate impacts of corn ethanol remain the subject of debate. Among other 
provisions, EISA requires that EPA analyze the life cycle emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) from biofuels to ensure that each category of renewable fuel emits fewer GHGs 
than the fossil fuel it replaces.  Life cycle analysis of CO2 from ethanol and other 
biofuels has proved difficult because researchers disagree on whether soil carbon 
emissions from planting and harvesting should be included in biofuels’ carbon footprints, 
and whether the impacts of land use change should be considered (Schnepf and 
Yacobucci 2013, Liska 2009, Searchinger 2008). 
Ethanol proponents point to national security as a reason to support a robust RFS.  
The Renewable Fuels Association claims that ethanol reduces the amount of oil the U.S. 
imports from the Middle East, from 60% to 41% of the U.S. fuel supply. Liska and Perrin 
have estimated the cost to the U.S. military of securing oil transportation routes at 
roughly $100 billion annually, or roughly 20 percent of the Department of Defense 
budget. Ethanol could play a role in reducing those costs, and DOD seems to agree: in 
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late 2013, the Navy announced a “Farm to Fleet” program with USDA to in which the 
Navy will purchase billions of gallons of domestic biofuels to help fuel its fleet.  
Numerous studies have addressed the desirability of the Renewable Fuel Standard 
compared to other policy options for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. DeGorter 
and Just (2010) contend that the combination of an ethanol production mandate and a tax 
credit for blending ethanol into the fuel supply actually encourages gasoline 
consumption—since gasoline producers received a tax credit through 2011 for blending 
ethanol into the gasoline supply, increased tax incentives encouraged greater gasoline 
use.  
Holland et al. (2013) examine how the RFS compares to a cap-and-trade (CAT) 
proposal, finding CAT to be more efficient.  But others are more optimistic that the RFS 
is effective. Cui et al. (2011) use a tractable computational model to compare welfare 
under several alternate fuel taxation and subsidy policies. Interestingly, they find “the 
second best instruments of a fuel tax and an ethanol subsidy come close to replicating the 
outcomes under the first best policy combination of oil import tariffs, corn export tariffs, 
and a carbon tax.”  
Perrin (2013) notes that the so-called blend wall is really more of a “blend 
curtain”—the wall could be overcome if just 20 percent of the 15 million flex fuel vehicle 
drivers already on the road used E85.  However, Perrin notes, E85—and by extension, 
even E15—have been unattractive options because ethanol has been “overpriced relative 
to its energy content” in recent years. Ethanol is roughly 65 percent as efficient as 
gasoline—so a flex-fuel vehicle (FFV) running on E85 typically gets 15-25% fewer miles 
7 
 
per gallon compared to E10 (EPA, DOE).  With high ethanol prices, the switch is 
uneconomical. 
Crago and Khanna (2014) compare second-best taxes on fuels. Assuming no other 
distortionary taxes are in place, a Pigouvian tax would equal the marginal external 
damage (MED) from economic activity, in this case, GHG emissions from driving. They 
note, however, that “in the presence of labor taxes and other market distortions, a 
Pigouvian first-best is unattainable. [. . .] The second best optimal carbon tax is higher 
than the MED for carbon emissions,” (p. 99), and that biofuel subsidies “erode welfare 
gains from carbon taxation” by increasing biofuel demand.  
Other researchers have compared a biofuel subsidy to carbon cap and trade 
(CAT), finding CAT preferable. Holland et al. (2011) examine the distributional impacts 
of the RFS and the Waxman-Markey carbon CAT bill that failed in the House of 
Representatives in 2009.  They find that RFS and CAT are policy substitutes, and “the 
greater a district’s gain from the RFS, the more money the district’s House Member 
received from organizations opposing Waxman-Markey,” (p. 2). Further, they find that 
although the national economic benefits from CAT outweighed those from RFS, the RFS 
benefits were more concentrated per capita in ethanol-producing counties, giving House 
members in those districts greater incentive to vote against Waxman-Markey than other 
members had to vote for it.  
A separate literature has dealt with the impact of increased gas mileage standards 
(CAFE) on the fuel supply and driving behavior.  Karplus et al. (2013) explore the effects 
of fuel economy standards (FES) alone and in combination with CAT policies proposed 
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in the 2009 Waxman-Markey bill.  They show that a “FES policy is at least six to 
fourteen times as costly to the economy as a gasoline tax that achieves the same 
cumulative reduction” (p. 331).  Further, “The cost and availability of vehicle efficiency 
technology, alternative fuel vehicles, and advanced low carbon fuels relative to other 
economy-wide GHG emissions abatement opportunities will determine whether a fuel 
economy standard binds when combined with a cap-and-trade policy, and the magnitude 
of its incremental economic cost” (p. 332).   
Lee and Wagner (2012) explore the so-called rebound effect from increased fuel 
efficiency. When drivers need to fuel up less often, the income effect of spending less on 
fuel may induce them to drive more—“Buy a more fuel efficient car, visit Grandma more 
often.” They note that studies in various parts of the world have found heterogeneous 
rebound effects, but that rebound effects typically decrease as real income increases. 
Built into CAFE standards, based on the literature, is an assumed 10 percent rebound 
effect. 
Until now, the renewable fuel standard and gas mileage standards (CAFE) have 
mostly been examined separately or compared to carbon cap and trade policies.  
Analyzing how the RFS and CAFE interact is important because unlike cap and trade, 
these two policies exist in the U.S. already, and they affect each other in ways that were 
unanticipated when each was created. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS 
The present research uses a comparative statics model to examine the interactions 
between RFS and CAFE, first in 2013, then in 2025, when updated CAFE standards have 
been fully implemented and average gas mileage for model year 2025 is 54.5 mpg. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Model: 
This analysis examines the markets for ethanol, gasoline, and corn and treats 
CAFE as a technological shock that induces a decrease in demand for fuels, to compare 
the states of each market in 2013 and 2025. Ethanol is made from corn, and gasoline, 
which are used in fixed proportions, assumed at 90 percent gasoline to 10 percent ethanol 
in U.S. motor fuel. Each of the 3 markets consists of a supply equation and a demand 
equation, yielding six equations in total in the simple case. Perrin (2011) explains that 
these equations determine the six endogenous variables G (quantity of gasoline), Pg 
(price of gasoline), E (quantity of ethanol), Pe (price of ethanol), C (quantity of corn), 
and Pc (price of corn).  
“The general approach of comparative statics is to take the total differential of 
each equation, then solve the system for the changes in endogenous variables (prices and 
quantities) caused by the exogenous ‘shock’ variable(s)” (Perrin). This approach allows 
one to calculate changes in prices and quantities, as well as changes in producer and 
consumer welfare due to exogenous shocks in the markets for the three goods. .   
“The log-linear version of comparative statics replaces absolute changes such as 
dG with relative changes dlnG=dG/G, and replaces slopes such as fc with elasticities such 
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as =dlnG/dlnPg, yielding the solution for the effect of the shock on the equilibrium 
system” (Perrin). Converting the supply and demand equations to logs allows one to 
determine percentage changes in each variable from one time period to the next. 
Initially, the consumer expenditure function is used with arguments of utility level 
(U), price of ethanol (), price of gasoline (), price of other consumer goods (), and 
CAFE, an exogenous shifter that reflects technological updates (improved fuel 
efficiency) that alter demand for gasoline and ethanol. 
 	 
,  , ,  ,  
(1) 
Demands for ethanol and gasoline are obtained using Shepard’s lemma from their 
respective price derivatives. The log linear total differentials are expressed below each 
supply and demand equation. 
Ethanol demand: 
 ⁄ 	   ,  , ,  ,  
(2) 
 	         
(3) 
where etas are Hicksian demand elasticities. 
Gasoline demand: 
 ⁄ 	  ,  , ,  ,  
(4) 
The log differential is 
 	        
(5) 
where etas are Hicksian demand elasticities. 
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Gasoline supply is assumed to be an exogenous function of the price of oil. 
 	 
 
(6) 
 	  
(7) 
where sigma is the supply elasticity. 
The ethanol industry is described with a cost function including arguments 
quantity of ethanol produced (E), price of corn (), price of other ethanol inputs (), 
and capital (K). 
 ! 	 
,  ,  , " 
(8) 
 
By Shepard’s lemma the ethanol inverse supply is: 
 
 !/ 	 ,  ,  , " 
(9) 
 
The total differential in log linear form is: 
 
 	         $" 
(10) 
 
where the sigmas are marginal cost elasticities. 
 
The Hicksian corn demand (for use in ethanol) is obtained by differentiating the 
ethanol industry cost function with respect to its price: 
/ 	  ,  , , " 
(11) 
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and its log differential is 
 
 
 	       $"  
                (12) 
 
where the etas are Hicksian derived demand elasticities. 
Corn supply to the ethanol industry is assumed to be an exogenous function of its 
own price. 
% 	 
& 
(13) 
with log differential 
 	 & 
(14) 
 
where sigma is a supply elasticity. 
 
Rearranging the above equations so that the dependent variables are on the left-
hand side and the shock variables are on the right-hand side yields the following system 
of six equations with six unknowns (where  represents price elasticities of demand and 
 represents price elasticities of supply). 
 	         
(15) 
 	        
(16) 
 	  
(17) 
 	         $" 
(18) 
 	       $" 
(19) 
 	 & 
(20) 
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Assuming no changes in the price of other crops or in the quantity of capital, 
dlnPoc and dlnK are set to 0.  dlnCAFE represents the exogenous shift in demand due to 
the increased efficiency of vehicles after CAFE standards are introduced. In addition, 
ethanol is produced from corn in fixed proportions, so the change in the derived demand 
of corn is equal to the change in the quantity of ethanol produced and does not respond to 
any other variables. 
The below matrix represents elasticities relating the supplies and demands for the 
three commodities to one another. The left-hand side sets up the market equilibria while 
the right side introduces the shock of CAFE. 
 
'
(
(
(
(
(
) 1 0 ,  , 0 0, 1 0 0 ,-. 0
0 0 ,-. ,-. 0 0
0 , , 1 0 0
,-. 0 0 0 ,-. 1
0 0 0 0 , ,/
0
0
0
0
0
1
 
'
(
(
(
(
)

2

 /
0
0
0
0
1
 	  
'
(
(
(
(
)
0
0
0
0 /
0
0
0
0
1
 
(21) 
 
The RFS is a mandate that induces production of ethanol above the equilibrium 
quantity in that market. To model RFS the system of equations is modified to represent 
this policy.  The mandate implied by RFS is represented as a change in the quantity 
supplied of ethanol by the following equation:  
 	 34 
(22) 
where dlnRFS represents the increase in quantity supplied of ethanol due to the mandate.  
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The RFS implies a wedge in the ethanol market with marginal cost above the 
price of ethanol that demanders are willing to pay.  This loss is passed to motor fuel 
consumers as higher prices.  Consumers of gasoline pay a price high enough to cover the 
loss induced in the ethanol market by the RFS regulation. Another equation is necessary 
to represent the relationship between the loss in the ethanol market induced by the 
mandate and the compensating revenue in the gasoline market required for motor fuel 
suppliers to survive in the industry.  This is: 
 
5  ,  %  6  	  
 
 
   –   
(23) 
where the expenditures are average of initial and final equilibrium expenditures on 
gasoline and ethanol, and the superscripts d refers to demand and s to supply. The system 
of equations used to capture the impact on the markets for ethanol, gasoline and corn 
under the RFS mandate is: 
 
 
 	 34 
(24) 
 	     
(25) 
 	    
(26) 
 	  
(27) 
 	     
(28) 
 	    
(29) 
 	 & 
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(30) 
  ,  %  	 %  ,   
(31) 
  ,  %  	  

 
  %  ,   
(32) 
 
When both policies—CAFE standards and the RFS mandate—are introduced 
simultaneously, the system of equations that allows analysis of positive and normative 
impacts in the markets for ethanol, gasoline, and corn is: 
  
 	 34 
(33) 
 	      
(34) 
 	      
(35) 
 	  
(36) 
 	     
(37) 
 	    
(38) 
 	 &  
(39) 
  ,  %  	  %  ,    
(40) 
  ,  %  	 
 
 
  %  –   
(41) 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Implementation 
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CAFE  
Wanner (2012) uses DOE projections on the makeup of the U.S. vehicle fleet to 
estimate the impact of CAFE in future years. Assuming that 1/13th of the U.S. vehicle 
fleet turns over annually based on average lifetime mileage, Wanner identifies expected 
fuel efficiency for different types of vehicles and their respective shares of the fleet. By 
aggregating the vehicle data, Wanner projects annual U.S. gasoline and ethanol 
consumption.  
Comparing expected consumption in 2013 and 2025, the technology shift from 
CAFE is represented as a 50 percent decline in both gasoline and ethanol demand. This 
amount is likely to decrease further after 2025 as more vehicles turn over and a larger 
portion of the total fleet is subject to 2025-level fuel mileage standards.  The 
displacement model matrix used to simulate this situation uses elasticity estimates from 
Cui et al. (2011) and Hossiso (2012) and can be seen below: 
 
dlnE dlnG dlnPe dlnPg dlnC dlnPc 
ethanol demand 1 0 3 -2.3 0 0 
-
50% 
gasoline 
demand 0 1 -0.26 0.96 0 0 
-
50% 
ethanol supply 0 0 1 0 0 -0.5 = 0% 
gasoline supply 0 -1 0 1.61 0 0 0% 
corn demand 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0% 
corn supply 0 0 0 0 -1 2.75 0% 
Table 2.1 
 
 
RFS  
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Since this analysis is restricted to corn ethanol—considered a “conventional 
biofuel” under the RFS—the RFS as currently implemented mandates only an 8.7% 
increase in the quantity used beyond current levels. That shock is represented in the 
matrix below, in this case imagining that CAFE does not exist in 2025. Further 
volumetric increases of ethanol called for in the RFS are in the advanced, biodiesel, and 
cellulosic categories (Schnepf, 2012) and are outside the purview of this study.   
Additionally, this study ignores the blend wall to examine how the RFS would 
impact ethanol markets if infrastructure barriers did not exist, both alone and in 
combination with CAFE.  The elasticities below are from the same source: Cui et al. 
(2011) and Hossiso (2012). The share coefficient of 8.36 in the last equation is the 
average ratio of expenditures in gasoline and ethanol in the initial and final equilibria. 
 
dlnE dlnG dlnPes dlnPed dlnPgd dlnPgs dlnC dlnPc 
ethanol mandate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.7% 
gasoline demand 0 1 0 -0.26 0.96 0 0 0 0% 
ethanol demand 1 0 0 3 -2.3 0 0 0 0% 
ethanol supply 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0.5 0% 
gasoline supply 0 1 0 0 0 -1.61 0 0 = 0% 
corn demand -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0% 
corn supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -2.75 0% 
Motor fuel distributors' 
equilibrium condition 0 0 -1.00 1.00 8.36 -8.36 0 0 0% 
Table 2.2 
  
 
 
RFS and CAFE 
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The matrices in table 2.3 represent the joint implementation of two shocks—the 
decrease in demand for gasoline and ethanol induced by increased efficiency from CAFE 
standards and the increase in the quantity of ethanol supplied as a result of the RFS 
mandate. 
 
dlnE dlnG dlnPes dlnPed dlnPgd dlnPgs dlnC dlnPc 
ethanol mandate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.7% 
gasoline demand 0 1 0 -0.26 0.96 0 0 0 -50% 
ethanol demand 1 0 0 3 -2.3 0 0 0 -50% 
ethanol supply 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0.5 = 0% 
gasoline supply 0 1 0 0 0 -1.61 0 0 0% 
corn demand -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0% 
corn supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -2.75 0% 
Motor fuel distributors' 
equilibrium condition 0 0 -1.00 1.00 8.36 -8.36 0 0 0% 
Table 2.3 
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2.3 Results and Implications:     
Market Effects of Alternative Scenarios 
  
Initial 
(2013) 2025 
  
  
CAFE 
alone  
RFS 
alone 
CAFE + 
RFS 
Ethanol supply price $2.50 $2.21 $2.54 $2.54 
Ethanol demand price $2.50 $2.21 $2.42 $1.62 
Ethanol quantity 13.8 B gal 5.1 B gal 15.0 B gal 15.0 B gal 
Gasoline demand 
price $3.50  $2.78 $3.50 $2.79 
Gasoline supply price $3.50  $2.78 $3.48 $2.64 
Gasoline quantity 120 B gal 80 B gal 119 B gal 72.4 B gal 
Corn price $4.00  $3.08 $4.12 $4.13 
Corn quantity 4.6 B bu 1.7 B bu 5.1 B bu 5.1 B bu 
          
Ratio of ethanol to gasoline 
quantities 10 % 6 % 11 % 17% 
 
Table 2.4 
Table 2.4 shows supply and demand prices and compares quantities demanded for 
the three commodities under the three policy scenarios. Where supply and demand prices 
for a commodity are the same, the scenario includes just one market price.  For cases 
where supply and demand prices differ, buyers and sellers face different prices. 
Removing the RFS entirely, as in the CAFE alone scenario, would cause a 
substantial drop in the quantity of ethanol demanded—and would also significantly 
decrease corn demand. In addition, the ratio of ethanol to gasoline quantities in the CAFE 
alone scenario decreases From 10 percent (E10) in 2013 to 6 percent (E6)—so the 
country uses comparatively less ethanol relative to gasoline in 2025 than it does today 
and nowhere near the amount required by the RFS mandate. Meanwhile, CAFE 
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technology, alone or in combination with RFS, can be expected to decrease gasoline 
consumption at least 25% implying a slight change in motor fuel mix from E10 to E11. 
Under the CAFE + RFS scenario—the status quo in the U.S.—demand prices for 
ethanol drop precipitously.  The RFS requires the ethanol industry to continue producing 
large quantities at subsidized prices even though demand for motor fuel declines 50  
 percent, so the result is a substantial change in the mix of ethanol to gasoline in the 
nation’s motor fuel, from an E10 to an E17 blend and a major gap between the supply 
price and the demand price.  Welfare analysis will show who benefits and who loses from 
the above effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare Effects of Alternative Scenarios in 2025 
              
  CAFE alone  RFS alone CAFE + RFS 
  (Dollars) (% of initial expenditure) (Dollars) (% of initial expenditure) (Dollars) (% of initial expenditure) 
∆ Ethanol CS $23,198,978,792.04 67.29% 
-
$1,925,595,797.31 -5.59% $10,145,905,843.25 29.43% 
∆ Gasoline 
CS $197,375,145,974.19 46.99% $3,063,714,843.11 0.73% $217,748,989,250.19 51.84% 
∆ Gasoline 
PS -$43,477,720,924.90 -10.35% $2,020,624,054.72 0.48% -$82,900,828,884.05 -19.74% 
∆ Corn PS -$230,845,310.14 -1.24% $613,449,733.63 3.30% $613,449,733.63 3.30% 
              
∆ Motor fuel 
CS $220,574,124,766.24 48.53% $1,138,119,045.80 0.25% $227,894,895,093.44 50.14% 
21 
 
 
A Hicksian-type measure is used here as a metric for consumer welfare.  It shows 
the change in consumer expenditures due to technological change given utility levels—
such as new technology from CAFE standards that increases vehicle efficiency.  This is 
modeled as a change in consumer expenditures given prices and utility levels (equation 1 
in this section) due to this technological change. 
Using this measure of consumer surplus (CS) and traditional measures of 
producer surplus (PS) as welfare measures, the above table shows welfare changes 
between 2013 and 2025 under each of the 3 scenarios. Changes are shown both in dollars 
and as a percentage of the economy-wide initial expenditure on the commodity being 
examined. (For reference, 2013 expenditures are $420 billion/year for gasoline, $34.4 
billion/year for ethanol, and $18.6 billion/year for corn. Motor fuel expenditures are the 
sum of gasoline and ethanol expenditures.) 
Consumers do not buy ethanol directly; they buy it as a component of motor fuel. 
So the change in motor fuel consumer surplus captures the benefits of a policy to both 
ethanol and gasoline consumers.   
Ethanol is made from fixed ratios of corn to other ingredients. Because corn 
demand in this study is perfectly inelastic, benefits to ethanol producers eventually accrue 
to corn producers—just as benefits to land-renting farmers ultimately accrue to 
landowners, because land is a fixed resource. So changes in ethanol PS are not shown 
because they are captured in the corn market. 
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Gasoline producer surplus is distributed among all participants up the gasoline 
supply chain—so it captures benefits not only to gas stations but also to refiners, 
blenders, and distributors. Thus, all of the welfare changes in the model are displayed 
above. 
 Motor fuel consumers benefit greatly under CAFE in 2025, gaining back nearly 
50 percent of their 2013 expenditures. More expensive new cars due to technological 
improvements from CAFE are not included in this analysis, but these results show that 
the significant increase in consumer surplus would allow for their purchase. Gasoline 
producers are 10 percent worse off under CAFE alone than in 2013, while corn producers 
are affected only modestly.  If the RFS existed in a vacuum in 2025, motor fuel 
consumers and gasoline producers would be relatively unaffected, while corn producers 
would be 3% better off. 
 If both policies are implemented simultaneously in 2025, the effects on gasoline 
producers in particular are dramatic. Gasoline producers are nearly 20 percent worse off 
than in 2013—twice as badly hurt as they are under CAFE alone. This is because the 
wedge between the supply price and the demand price for ethanol widens considerably. 
In the long run, the gap is passed on to consumers as higher gasoline prices—but if both 
policies are implemented simultaneously, gasoline producers will suffer a larger loss in 
welfare. 
Corn producers are equally well off under the RFS with or without CAFE, while 
motor fuel consumers benefit slightly from both policies together, edging their gains to 
just above 50 percent from 48 percent under CAFE alone. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSION 
  This study examines the market only for corn ethanol and ignores cellulosic 
ethanol. Fully implementing the cellulosic provisions of the RFS would significantly 
impact these results, but thus far, cellulosic technology has not been commercialized 
nearly as fast as anticipated under the EISA in 2007. 
  This analysis demonstrates that CAFE standards offer significant benefits to 
consumers by 2025 and beyond, while the effects of the RFS between now and 2025 are 
more modest.  The increased cost of buying new, more efficient cars under CAFE is not 
included in the analysis; consumers would use some of the increased consumer surplus to 
purchase them.  
  The present research also ignores the blend wall to show that if there were no 
infrastructure barriers to increasing the ethanol blend, staying on the current path of 
implementing CAFE and RFS simultaneously—with no changes—would result in a 
substantial increase in motor fuel blend to E17.  If the quantities mandated are fixed by 
the RFS, the declining demand for ethanol and gasoline in the motor fuel supply will 
result in lower prices—hurting gasoline producers. This study shows that the current 
blend wall is incompatible with current RFS and CAFE mandates.  Further, when RFS 
and CAFE are combined in 2025, gasoline producers lose 20 percent of their 2013 
receipts.  
  With slight changes in market realities or in policy, the RFS and CAFE standards 
could better coexist.  Policymakers could encourage the purchase of flex-fuel vehicles 
that can use up to 85% ethanol (E85)—or simply educate owners of existing FFVs that 
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their cars can handle higher ethanol blends. States could also be incented to offer more 
E15 fueling stations.  
  However, policymakers cannot expect those measures to succeed until ethanol 
prices better align with its energy content. Lower corn prices would help bring ethanol’s 
price back in line with its mileage value—and at least in the short run, that change seems 
likely. USDA projects 2015-16 corn prices at $3.30 per bushel, 27% below 2013-14 
prices (Westcott 2014). Lower corn prices would make higher ethanol blends more 
economical alternatives to gasoline. 
  In summary, motor fuel consumers benefit greatly from CAFE standards, while 
welfare changes from the RFS alone between now and 2025 will be relatively modest. 
CAFE and RFS, implemented together, have a minimal impact on ethanol producers in 
2025. This analysis suggests that the fears of many in the corn and ethanol industries are 
unfounded—that EPA slightly downshifting RFS targets this year would not cause the 
ethanol market to collapse, but could help avoid an untenable gap between the supply 
price and the demand price of ethanol several years in the future. 
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